XVIII Airborne Corps Deception on Kuwaiti Border (15 OCT 1990)
Between Oct. 15 and Nov. 28, 1990, the XVIII Airborne Corps conducted a defensive deception operation as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD in Saudi Arabia. This was an informative precursor to a larger offensive deception operation coalition forces unleashed during the ground campaign of Operation DESERT STORM three months later.
Within days of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, the U.S. launched Operation DESERT SHIELD to defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi expansion. By Aug. 9, Lt. Gen. Gary Luck’s XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post touched down at Dhahran Airport. The Corps’ presence in the Persian Gulf grew over the following two months, as did the number of Iraqi divisions in Kuwait. Saddam Hussein’s intentions to invade Saudia Arabia were unknown, but intelligence analysts concluded he had the capability to do so. The U.S. needed time to deploy enough air and ground forces to deter any attempts to seize Saudi oil fields, ports, and airfields.
Even before the deployment of the XVIII Airborne Corps, its Deception Element began planning for the unit’s deception operations. In 1990, deception was considered something of a “lost art” in the U.S. Army. Attempts to revitalize the capability began with the 1988 publication of FM 90-2 "Battlefield Deception" (BAT-D) and the implementation of associated training. FM 90-2 and the 1989 FM 100-15 "Corps Operations" called for twelve-member BAT-D cells working with the corps G-3 planners and similar cells in the divisional MI battalions to execute deception plans.
Maj. Gary P. Melton, a West Point graduate who had received his commission as an infantry officer in 1975, led the XVIII Airborne Corps Deception Element. On Aug. 27, 1990, he led an initial planning and administrative group to Saudi Arabia. Once there, they continued “the corps planning cycle we began back at Fort Bragg and put the first deception equipment package on the ground.” The remaining six members of Melton’s team followed over the next two months, along with additional communication emulators and camouflage decoys on loan from the deception equipment office at Fort Belvoir.
As planning for the offensive campaign continued, the G-3 planners considered ways to deter further Iraqi expansion. In lockstep, Major Melton’s Deception Element provided courses of action that dovetailed with the G-3’s operational plans. Hussein’s forces seemed to be positioned to invade along the coastal roads into Saudi Arabia with the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLine) Road as their first strategic objective. Thus, the deception plan, according to Major Melton, was
to portray our corps establishing a defense in a sector along the TAPLine Road [near al-Jubayl in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province]. We tried to portray the sparse Pan-Arab forces as the only covering force forward of TAPLine Road, when, in fact, a large U.S. covering force was there. . . If believed, this deception would have confused Iraqi command and control when they ran into a formidable U.S. covering force before they expected.
Initially, Melton’s team conducted the deception, but later in the six-week operation, the 101st Airborne, 24th Infantry, and 1st Cavalry divisions began complementary operations. The deception operation utilized a wide variety of elements to enhance its credibility. This included planting decoy tracked and wheeled vehicles and forward arming and refueling points; posting unit signage; transmitting real, high frequency, radioteletype traffic in deception mode; running vehicle convoys; moving troops in and around local towns; and conducting psychological operations.
Whether this early deception effort succeeded was unclear because the Iraqis did not attack into Saudi Arabia. Yet, it was educational for Melton’s team, who confirmed the deception equipment, including signal emulators, worked in the desert environment. The operation also led Melton to recommend consolidating division and corps deception cells to ensure sufficient resources to enhance the deception’s credibility. Ultimately, the team’s operations helped inform the successful deception operations the coalition undertook as part of the DESERT STORM ground offensive that kicked off the following February.
Article by Lori S. Stewart, USAICoE Command Historian. New issues of This Week in MI History are published each week. To report story errors, ask questions, request previous articles, or be added to our distribution list, please contact: TR-ICoE-Command-Historian@army.mil.
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